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A crucial feature of the short-run perspective in many policy-relevant issues is the existence of unemployment due to
wage rigidities. At the same time, imperfections in the degree of factor mobility between sectors or regions deter-
mine the nature and flexibility of the responses of the economy to exogenous shocks. It is no wonder then that the in-
cidence of taxation upon employment and income distribution is a central preoccupation of the fiscal authorities. In
this paper we explore the structure of the incidence and the economic effects of a selective capital income tax in a
neoclassical, two-sector, two-factor, short-period model in which the existence of a sticky wage that exceeds the
maximum level consistent with full-employment leads to unemployment of labour.
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1. Introduction: Unemployment, factor mobility and taxes
A crucial feature of the short-run perspective in many policy-relevant issues is the exis-
tence of unemployment due to wage rigidities. At the same time, imperfections in the degree
of factor mobility between sectors or regions determine the nature and flexibility of the res-
ponses of the economy to exogenous shocks. It is no wonder then that the incidence of taxa-
tion upon employment and income distribution is a central preoccupation of the fiscal au-
thorities.
Surprisingly, the theory of public finance has devoted relatively little attention to the
analysis of the microeconomic effects of taxation in the presence of unemployment. The first
contributions on this issue may be found in the literature on regional development of the 60’s
and early 70’s. The need for regional policies is justified in this literature on the grounds of
differences in both regional income and regional employment.
The works in the field of regional economics suffer from two main shortcomings. First,
rigorous general-equilibrium arguments are absent in the analysis of the employment effects
of taxation, perhaps with the exceptions of McLure (1971) and Behuria (1984). On the other
hand, despite the fact that regional economics has been equated to the «economics of re-
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tions and the diversity of taxes and subsidies is lacking in these contributions. The recent sur-
veys on tax incidence by Kotlikoff and Summers (1987) and Fullerton and Metcalf (2003) do
not report any attempts to fill out these deficiencies.
This paper focuses on these aspects of tax policy, in an attempt to extend the analysis of
the imperfect-mobility-full-employment case (González-Páramo, 1993) to a less-than-
full-employment context. Our concern is with a time frame so short that factor supplies and
the wage rule do not change, but long enough to allow for all markets to clear —the labour
market by quantity rationing, the capital and the goods markets by price adjustments— for
any degree of capital mobility. Applied to this context, our model will have the following
features: i) changes in employment and its sectoral distribution will be explained by changes
in relative prices; ii) the distributional incidence of taxation will depend upon both changes
in relative prices and changes in employment, and iii) the impact of changes in mobility con-
ditions upon the price effects and the employment effects of taxation will be explicitly iden-
tified.
The organization of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the general structure of
the model and the equations of change following the introduction of a variety of selective
taxes. The main novelties with respect to González-Páramo (1993) are the formulation of a
wage function relating changes in the nominal wage with respect to changes in a basket of
consumer prices, and the absence of explicit labour mobility conditions. In the presence of a
generalized minimum wage, movements of (homogeneous) labour across sectors cannot be
made dependent upon intersectoral wage differentials. In order to simplify the analysis, it
will be assumed that firms are not rationed in any market, i.e. there are no impediments to
any desired adjustments in factor demands at the prevailing prices. This postulate makes la-
bour mobility irrelevant in our context. Two features of the workings of the model should be
mentioned. First, when intersectoral capital movements are sluggish to some extent, the
model does not exhibit «fix price» characteristics, in the sense that the feedback effects of
quantities upon prices must be taken into account, contrary to the perfect factor mobility case
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). Secondly, the price effects of taxation are determined without
any intervention of the labour market conditions.
Sections 3 and 4 will analyse the price effects and the employment effects, respectively,
of the imposition of a selective capital income tax, both in terms of balanced-budget inci-
dence and differential incidence. The taxes considered as a basis of comparison will be a se-
lective consumption tax and a selective wage tax. One of the most interesting results esta-
blishes that employed labour in both sectors and capital in the taxed sector share a common
interest with regard to policies intended to increase the degree of capital mobility and
equal-yield tax substitutions. Both groups will favour policies oriented to increase capital
mobility, and they will prefer a selective wage tax to a selective consumption tax and the lat-
ter to a selective capital income tax. The rationale behind these curious implications of the
analysis -which are in sharp contrast with Mieszkowski’s (1967) well-known results, i.e. la-
bour always prefers a tax on capital and vice versa- has to do with the differential impact of
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mobile, a wage tax is preferred by employed labour because it produces the largest increase
in the wage rate. At the same time, this tax has the strongest factor substitution effect in fa-
vour of capital employed in the taxed sector.
Of course, the above ranking of taxes does not apply when we focus upon the em-
ployment effects of taxation. As we shall show in Section 4, taxes which harm capital the
most -i.e. those which produce the lowest increases in wages- are the best from the em-
ployment perspective. In general, policies aimed to alter the degree of capital mobility
have ambiguous effects upon the level of employment, depending upon the elasticities of
factor substitution in both sectors, the elasticity of substitution in demand and the differ-
ential in factor intensities, among other parameters. This section is completed by analy-
zing the sectoral distribution of tax-induced employment changes and the related ques-
tion of which is «the» best regional subsidy for employment creation. As we shall show,
for a given resource cost and any degree of capital mobility, a regional subsidy given to
capital will cause larger capital inflows than does a subsidy on production, with a wage
subsidy causing the smallest inflows (this result holds in the full-employment case as
well; see McLure, 1970). However, this ordering of subsidies is reversed when the policy
objective is employment creation, as long as substitution possibilities exist in the subsi-
dized region. In fact, capital subsidies might reduce employment in the target region. The
paper concludes with section 5, which presents the main conclusions and includes some
final comments.
2. A simple general equilibrium model
Before beginning our analysis, we list three issues upon which our discussion in this
paper has some bearing: i) Mobility and shifting. How does the mobility effect of a selec-
tive capital income tax work when part of the labour force is unemployed? ii) Capital in-
come taxation versus a wage tax. In the presence of unemployment, we may gain some in-
sight by comparing the incidence of a capital income tax to the distributional impact of a
wage tax. iii) Employment effects and the distribution of the tax burden. When the level of
employment is sensitive to the imposition of a selective capital income tax, the distribution
of the burden between labour and capital does not depend only upon the price effects of
taxation. Tax induced changes in employment will have an effect upon labour’s income as
well.
2.1. Structure
The model can be sketched as follows. A closed economy is assumed to have two pri-
mary factors of production that may be used to produce two final outputs, X and Y. The en-
dowments of the two factors, labour (L) and capital (K), are fixed at the levels K and L, res-
pectively. Constant returns to scale and non-specialization characterize production in this
Imperfect factor mobility, unemployment, and the short-period incidence of a capital income tax 25economy. The goods and the capital markets are competitive. Competition in production is
represented by the zero-profits conditions:
p = cX(w LX, rX KX) [1]
1=cY(w, rY) [2]
where p is the relative price of X, ci is the unit cost of production in sector i(i=X,Y), and  jX =
=1 + tjX is the tax factor, where tjX is the ad valorem tax rate on the net reward of factor j (j=
= K,L) in sector X.
Full employment of capital is represented by the equality:
[3]
while the assumption of unemployment implies that the wage rate is such that labour demand
will fall short of the endowment of labour:
[4]
It is assumed that some labour remains unemployed before and after the introduction of
any taxes or subsidies.
The main features of the model are those related to wage rigidity and factor mobility.
The former has implications for the formulation of the demand side of the model. Now we
turn to these assumptions.
Unemployment is introduced by postulating the existence of an exogenously given wage
function of the type:
w = w(q,1), !w(.)/!q " 0 [5]
homogeneous of degree one in consumer prices, where w is the generalized wage measured
in terms of good Y, q=p x is the consumer price of X in terms of Y, and  x=1+tx is the selec-
tive consumption tax factor, where tx is the «ad valorem» tax rate on the consumption of
good X. Following Brecher (1974), we restrict the analysis to situations where the real wage
exceeds the minimum level consistent with full employment. Although the above wage rule
may be subject to much criticism 1, here we follow the standard tradition in taking [5] as a
reasonable simplification of reality (see Brecher, 1971, 1974, Johnson, 1965, Helpman,
1971, Dixit, 1976, 1981, and Das, 1981, among others). Essentially, the wage rule is treated
here as a «fact of life» which, for social or political reasons, government and unions are una-
ble or unwilling to alter in the short-run 2. In fact, a wage rule depending only upon prices of
goods may be optimal in a second-best world (Blanchard, 1979). Further, it is consistent with
the observed short-run behaviour of wages (Blanchard, 1998) 3.
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    XX K X L X YY Kr w X Krw Y K (, , ) ( , , )
    # XX K X L X YY Lr w X Lr w Y L L (, , ) ( , , )As in the full-employment case (González-Páramo, 1993), capital is assumed to respond
to rental differentials with any parametrically given speed. This condition may be repre-
sented by the expression:
[6]
(which holds only locally) where KO is the allocation of capital to sector X at the initial equi-
librium, and K is the elasticity of supply of capital to sector X with respect to the relative net
earnings differential. The assumption of generalized sticky wage does not allow to introduce
a similar mobility condition for labour. However, if we assume that firms are not rationed in
any market (i.e. there are no impediments to any desired adjustments in factor demands at the
prevailing prices), labour mobility is irrelevant. As long as a unit of labour is employed, it
obtains the wage w.
It was suggested above that the existence of rationing in the labour market due to the
presence of a rigid real wage has special implications for the specification of the demand for
goods. In an influential article, Dixit (1976) pointed out that when employment is cons-
trained to a level below the total supply of labour, consumer’s choice may be represented by
means of the «partial expenditure function»:
[7]
where U(X,Y,L) is the «partial» or constrained direct utility function. According to equation
[7], changes in compensated demands respond not only to changes in q, but also to any ad-
justments in the level of employment, i.e.:
X = X(q,L,U) [8]
Y = Y(q,L,U) [9]
For small changes, we have:
[10]
[11]
where «^» indicates proportional changes, and iX and iL are the compensated elasticities of
good i with respect to the relative price of X and labour, respectively, and Z is aggregate in-
come. If we retain the standard assumption of homotheticity of preferences over goods (for a
given employment level), we have dU(e/U)[XZ–YZ](1/Z) = 0 (where iZ is the income
elasticity of the demand for good i). Thus,
Imperfect factor mobility, unemployment, and the short-period incidence of a capital income tax 27
     K XX Y K KK r r 0(/), 0
eqL U M i nq X Y UXYL U
XY







Xp L d U
XZU









Yp L d U
YZU







From the zero-degree homogeneity in prices of X and Y, –%YX=%YY, which implies:
[13]
where $S =– ( %XX + %YY) is the elasticity of substitution in demand between X and Y.
The latter formulation explicit takes into account the reactions of the rationed con-
sumer 4, and shows that homotheticity does not suffice to ensure a one-to-one relationship
between the composition of demand, X/Y, and the relative price of good X, q. It turns out,
however, that the results of the analysis become ambiguous when %XL )% YL. For simplicity,
we assume in the remainder of the present paper that %XL = %YL, i.e. X and Y are equally good
substitutes for (complements of) labour (relaxation of this assumption is a straightforward
but tedious exercise), an assumption that amounts to posit separability between goods and la-
bour.
This completes the specification of the model. The incidence of a selective capital in-
come tax can be determined by the familiar comparative-static approach. Before doing so, a
note on the role of capital mobility is in order.
2.2. Comparative-static analysis
a) The role of capital mobility
In order to convey the intuition of some of the effects of taxation in the presence of unem-
ployment, we begin this section with a brief comment on the relationship between prices and
quantities in the present model. Take the standard case of a small open economy. Here the
terms of trade are given from abroad, and the resulting price system:
pc w r X  (, )
[14a]
1=cY (w,r)
is self-contained and independent of demand factors 5. This situation also corresponds to the
case of a closed economy with perfect factor mobility and an infinitely elastic demand. Howe-
ver, once we allow imperfectly elastic demands, the relative price p will be determined only
if demand considerations are introduced.
Let us now introduce into the system the wage rule [5]:
[14b]
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*+ XX pcw p r (, 1 ) ,  
*+ YX cw p r 1( , 1 ) ,  It becomes clear that the wage rule brings us back to a two-equation system in two vari-
ables, p and r, whose solution (if it exists) is unique. The price system is again self-con-
tained, and the relationship between prices and quantities is unidirectional 6.
Of course, the crucial element that explains this curious result is the assumption of per-
fect capital mobility. This assumption implies that capital responds to exogenous shocks
with enough speed as to equate capital rentals by means of intersectoral movements of capi-
tal before the wage rule changes in response, say, to the persistence of an excess supply of la-
bour. However, as noted by Neary (1982), perfect capital mobility and stability of the wage
rule are not consistent assumptions in a short-run perspective. In our context, introducing im-
perfect capital mobility amounts to restore the feedback from quantities to prices. In effect,
the price system becomes:
[14c]
where the relationship between rX and rY is determined by the mobility condition [6] and, in-
directly, by the remaining variables of the model. Given the levels of q and w(q), there exists
a single value of ri that enables the i-firms to produce and satisfy the zero-profit condition. If
this ri is consistent with the mobility condition and we rule out complete specialization, p
and w must change, and hence, the composition of demand, the output level of each sector
and the demand for labour will change. The degree of capital mobility, thus, becomes a cru-
cial determinant of incidence and the employment-effects of selective capital income taxes
and subsidies.
b) The system of incidence
The system just described in subsection 2.1 contains seven independent equations in
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*+ XX X pcw p r (, 1 ) ,  
*+ YX Y cw p r 1( , 1 ) ,  
X wp ˆˆ ˆ () 	  
SX XY p ˆˆ ˆˆ ()   $   
LX X LY Y LL L ˆˆ ˆ , ,
KX X KY Y KK ˆˆ 0 , ,
XK X Y Kr r ˆ ˆˆ () $ 
LY KY Y wr ˆˆ 0 - -
LX LX KX X KX pw r ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ () ( ) -  -  where 	 is the elasticity of the nominal wage with respect to the consumer price of good X,
-ji is the share of the j-th factor in the value of the i-th product, and ,ji is the share in the total
supply of factor j of the amount of this factor employed in sector i. The analysis will concen-
trate upon changes in factor incomes. For this reason, we will not deal explicitly with
changes in X and Y. On the other hand, the relationship that exists between w, rY and p
through the zero-profit conditions allows to derive all the relevant results once the system of
is solved for the changes in p, rX. and L.
The first equation of change of the system is obtained directly from the zero-profit con-
dition in sector X. Combining expressions [15] and [16], we get:
[22]
On the other hand, introducing the zero-profit condition [17] into the full-employment
expression [19], and taking into account the conditions on mobility and demand, our second
equation of change can be expressed as 7:
[23]
where:
and ~ / $$ , KK K Y  .
The only relationship of the model not used so far is the employment demand expression
[20]. Using the equivalences:
and the conditions on demand, substitution and factor mobility, we can write:
[24]
where:
We can now rewrite the system [22]-[24] in matrix form as:
[25]
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ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 10
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () 0 ( )
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ () 1 ( )The system of incidence reveals a noteworthy feature of the response of the economy to
exogenous shocks when the wage rule is binding. Given the parameters of demand, substitu-
tion and mobility, competition in production determines the equilibrium changes in p, w, rX
and rY, irrespective of the employment conditions of the economy. Notice that the system
[25] is recursive: the first two relationships determine  rX and  p —and, thus, w and  rY —
without any intervention of  L. Once the competitive rates of change of the price variables are
determined, firms will adjust their demand for labour accordingly.
Denoting the determinant of the system [25] by |
|, it is easily checked that:
where:
	 = (1–	)-KY + 	-KX
Having determined the sign of |
|, it is now a straightforward matter to compute the ex-
pressions for the impact of a change in the tax rate on factor prices and the level of employ-
ment. This is the focus of the analysis in the following sections.
3. Tax incidence (I): Price effects
In presence of unemployment (or underemployment) of the labour force, the focus of in-
terest of incidence analysis is somewhat different to that in a full-employment context. The
usual way of considering the (weighted) rental-(weighted) wage ratio is obviously not suffi-
cient. This is because changes in the price variables of the model will tend to generate
changes in the equilibrium level of the demand for labour and, hence, in total labour’s in-
come. lf we think in unemployment as the fraction of labour that consumers are unable to sell
in the labour market at the prevailing prices, we can easily see that relative prices do not con-
vey enough information so as to determine whether the imposition of a selective capital in-
come tax benefits labour or not. Indeed, the ratios w/rX and w/rY could rise as a result of the
tax with labour as a whole being worse off relative to the pre-tax situation. Although the tax
change will make labour owners better off with regard to the units of labour that remain em-
ployed, the fall in total employment could outweigh the former effect and reduce the relative
share of labour in the functional distribution of income. In order to deal separately with these
issues, in the present section we analyse the price-effects of taxation and leave to Section 4
the study of the employment-effects.
3.1. Balanced-budget incidence: The mobility effect
In order to determine the price-effects associated to the introduction of selective tax on
profits, it is natural to start the analysis by assuming that the tax revenue is returned back to
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consumers in a lump-sum fashion. In this case, the incidence of the tax can be determined by
solving the system [25] for  p and  rX , with     LX X  0 and   KX 00:
[26]
[27]
Combining equation [26] and the wage rule [15], we get:
[28]
Finally, substituting [28] into the zero-profit condition [17], we obtain the tax-induced
change in the untaxed sector’s profits:
[29]
Comparing the above incidence expressions with those obtained in González-Páramo
(1993) for the full-employment case, we can see the marked differences. Under full-employ-
ment, tax incidence is determined by the relative factor intensities (the factor intensity differ-
ential effect), the relative degrees of factor mobility (the factor mobility differential effect)
and the elasticities of factor substitution (the factor tax effect). These three effects do not al-
ways work in the same direction, and tax incidence is a priori indeterminate. In the unem-
ployment model, relative factor intensities and the relative degrees of mobility do not play
any role. Mobility differentials are not important because —provided that firms are not ra-
tioned in any market— labour mobility is irrelevant. On the other hand, intensity differen-
tials are absent from [26]-[29] because of the relaxation of the full-employment assumption.
When sector X, say, is not constrained to absorb the labour force released by sector Y, the
Stolper-Samuelson-type effect ceases to hold.
The equations of change [26]-[29] establish a simple and determinate pattern of inci-
dence. As a result of the introduction of a selective tax on capital in sector X, factor and prod-
uct prices change according to:
[30]
The results only depend upon the degree of capital mobility, ~ $K , and the parameter of
wage indexation, 	. Provided that capital is mobile and assuming that good X has a positive
weight in the consumer price index, the tax will raise the wage rate and lower the rate of re-
turn to capital in both sectors, with capital in the taxed sector bearing most of the burden.
When capital is sector-specific, we get back the familiar full-capitalization result, with capi-
tal in sector X bearing the full burden of the tax. Thus, the fact that unemployment exists
32 JOSÉ M. GONZÁLEZ-PÁRAMO
KX K KX p
1 ˆ 0
 / - $  " 
LY KX
XL X X Y K K X S K X
KY
r
1 ˆˆ (1 ) ( ) 0
  	- -
/   	- $  $  $  - $  ' 
- 

KX K KX w
1 ˆˆ 0







/ $  '
-

KX Y X KX K
KX Y X KX K
p w r r as all
pwr r w h e n
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 00 0
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 00
 0 " " " 0 0   	" #$ #(
 0  0     $

does not alter the well-known immobility result 8. Finally, note that the ranking in [30] for
~ K 0establishes that subsidization of the cost of use of capital in sector X will tend to make
capital owners better-off in terms of both goods, and will worsen the distributional position
of employed labour in terms of good Y.
How do changes in the degree of capital mobility alter the magnitude of factor price res-
ponses to the imposition of the tax? The answer to this question (which is implicit in 30) is
easily established if we make use of a notion introduced in González-Páramo (1993): the
«mobility effect», i.e. the fraction of the tax that capital in sector X succeeds in passing on to
other factors of production. Denoting the mobility effect by  rX
M , we have:
[31]
This simple expression and equation [28] allow us to synthesize the main effects of au-
tonomous changes in the degree of capital mobility in the following:
Proposition 1:
Following the imposition of a selective capital income tax in sector X:
i) The mobility effect is always positive (i.e. capital in sector X will never bear more than
100 percent of the tax) and tends to operate «rapidly», in the sense that increases in capital mo-
bility will benefit capital owners more the lower is the initial degree of capital mobility;
ii) Employed labour in both sectors and capital in the taxed sector share a common in-
terest with regard to policies intended to increase the degree of capital mobility, for al
0~ K <, >0; and,
iii) Capital employed in the taxed and the untaxed sectors have conflicting interests with
regard to policies intended to increase the degree of capital mobility, for all 0~ K <, >0.
In order to prove the above results, we just need to differentiate partially the expressions
for  /  rX
M
KX  and  /  w KX  with respect to ~ K :
[32a]
[32b]
(since the numerator of 32a does not contain terms in~ K ), which establish part i). Similarly,
[33]
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imply parts ii) and iii) of Proposition 1. Although i) does not contradict the results in a
full-employment economy, ii) and iii) are of special interest both because of their paradoxi-
cal nature and their generality (which contrasts with the most of results associated to the full
employment case):
[35]
The above result is not difficult to understand. As the degree of capital mobility increases,
the tax-induced outflow of capital from sector X will tend to increase, thus raising the value of
the marginal product of capital units that remain employed in X (i.e. the tax-induced fall in rX
will be smaller than otherwise). With the unit cost of X rising,  pand  w must rise. Given py =1 ,
the fact that  w rises implies that  ri will tend to fall. Obviously, these adjustments may show
themselves inconsistent with the employment level prevailing before the change in ~ K . Sec-
tion 4 shall deal with these (potential) mobility-induced employment effects.
3.2. Differential incidence: a consumption tax and a wage tax
The findings in the foregoing subsection hinge upon the possibility of returning back the tax
proceeds to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. When the fiscal adjustments to keep the govern-
ment budget balanced are non-neutral, we must examine the composite effects of the introduc-
tion of the tax and the use of the revenues by the government. Here we consider two plausible al-
ternatives of revenue use: a selective subsidy on consumption of good X, -tX, and a wage subsidy
on labour employed in industry X, -tLX. This exercise shall further illuminate the nature of the in-
cidence of a selective capital income tax —since it amounts to analyse the differential incidence
of all three selective taxes— and will enable us to compare the unemployment results to the classic
full-employment differential tax incidence propositions established by Mieszkowski (1967).
The balanced-budget. incidence expressions for a consumption tax and a wage tax are
obtained by solving [25] for  LX and  X
9. The equal-revenue conditions are given by the
equalities tX pX = tKX rX KX and tLX wLX = tKX rX KX, respectively. Differentiating totally and
noting that all taxes are zero at the initial equilibrium (which implies  
dt), the tax rates that
ensure equal revenues are:
 
  XK X K X 
 [36a]
for a selective tax on consumption of X, and
 (/)  
 
  LX KX LX KX 
 [36b]
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    for a selective wage tax. Substituting conditions [36a]-[36b] into the balanced-budget ex-
pressions, and subtracting the resulting expressions from results [26]-[29], we obtain the
differential incidence equations, which appear in Tables 1 and 2. Some inspection of the
expressions in these tables reveals the importance of capital mobility and technical substi-
tution in the taxed sector. The main results are the best summarized in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2:
i) Employed labour in both sectors and capital in the taxed sector share a common in-
terest with respect to equal-yield tax substitutions, provided that capital is imperfectly mo-
bile (0'~ $K <(): both factors prefer a selective wage tax to a selective tax on consumption,
and the latter to a selective capital income tax.
ii) Capital employed in the taxed and the untaxed sectors have conflicting interests
with regard to the above equal-yield tax substitutions, as long as 0'~ $K <(.
iii) When capital is perfectly mobile (~ $K 1( ), labour and capital employed in both
sectors are indifferent to all three taxes.
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-lf we recall Mieszkowski’s (1967, Math. Appendix) basic finding —under full-employ-
ment and perfect factor mobility capital (labour) always prefers a selective wage (selective
capital income) tax to a selective consumption tax, and the latter to a selective capital income
(selective wage) tax—, we must conclude that the results in Proposition 2 are surprising.
However, the rationale behind this proposition is not difficult to understand. Let us start with
part iii). The solution of system [25] for ~ K can be represented in matrix form as:
[37]
where ||= LX–LY=KY–KX (KX+LX=KY+LY=1). When the nominal wage responds to
changes in p ( > 0), any tax raises the wage rate (because  qp X   	 0) and reduces pro-
fits in both sectors of the economy. As we pointed out in subsection 2.2.a) above, when the
wage rate is set above the level consistent with full-employment and mobility is perfect, the
price system is self-contained:
[38]
i.e. factor substitution and demand considerations have no bearing upon the price effects of
taxation. In absence of incentives for factor substitution in the taxed sector (factor substitu-
tion is precisely the source of Mieszkowski’s full-employment result), any equal-yield tax
change will be neutral with regard to its impact upon relative prices, i.e. the price effects of
all three taxes will be identical.
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0    k    kFigure 1 illustrates the case of tKX versus tLX. For a given relative producer price of X, p,
cost minimization implies:
 rX =–   KX
 rY 0
and
 rX =– (/)  --   LX KX LX
 rY 0
respectively. On the other hand, the equal-yield condition [36b] requires that the tax rate in
sector X be   LX =– (/)  --   KX LX KX . According to the above expressions, this implies that
the horizontal shift of the unit-cost schedule cX(.) will be identical under both taxes.
The case of tKX versus tX is slightly more complicated, because both unit-cost curves,
cX(.) and cY(.) and the wage rule schedule will shift (see Figure 2) according to (for a
given p):
i.e. – rX "(<) – rY as |-|"(<)0. The final result will be identical to that under a selective capital
income tax, with p now rising -KX times less than under tKX (due to the fact that
  -  XK X K X  , according to condition 36a).
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Figure 1. Differential tax incidence under perfect capital mobility: tKX versus tLX
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ˆˆ (/)When capital is imperfectly mobile (~ $K <(), factor substitution and demand forces play
a role (see subsection 2.2.a) and the above tax equivalences break down (except in the spe-
cial case of fixed-coefficients technology in sector X). Under partial capital mobility, the
preferences of the owners of capital —which is fully employed— between the three taxes
coincide with those in Mieszkowski’s ranking: a selective capital income (selective wage)
tax is the worst (best) tax, because it generates the strongest (weakest) substitution effect
against capital use in the taxed sector. For a given (net) wage rate, it can be seen that taxes
which hurt capital the least are precisely those which raise the relative consumer price of X,
q, the most. This implies, in turn, that labour units employed in both sectors will get the high-
est (lowest) increase under a wage (capital) tax. Hence the result in part i) of Proposition 2.
On the other hand, from the price equation of the untaxed sector we can see that whatever
benefits labour in Y harms capital employed in this industry. This fact, combined with the co-
incidence of interests of capital used in sector X and labour employed in both industries, ex-
plain the result in ii).
4. Tax incidence (II): Employment effects
Having analysed the price effects of taxation in our model in the last section, the stage is
now set for the derivation of the equations that determine the employment effects associated
to the imposition of a selective capital income tax. The conclusion reached above that any
tax improves the position of «employed labour» in both sectors, though surprising to some
extent, is not difficult to understand once we recognize the possibilities that firms have to re-
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Figure 2. Differential tax incidence under perfect capital mobility: tKX versus tXadjust their demand for labour to a level consistent with the cost-minimizing conditions fa-
cing them (i.e. the nominal wage equals the value of the marginal product of labour). The
purpose of exploring the employment effects of taxation needs little justification. The exis-
tence of minimum wage laws and COLA mechanisms (established under the pressures ex-
erted by unions and/or enacted by paternalist governments with the purpose of ensuring an
«adequate» minimum living standard to workers) is a widespread phenomenon both in de-
veloped and less developed economies. On the other hand, the very presence of unemploy-
ment is generally regarded as a social evil. Thus, it might seem reasonable to have an explicit
employment objective in economic policy-making. In this spirit we will now present two
versions of the equation that describes the employment effects of a selective capital income
tax, each serving a different analytical purpose.
4.1. Employment effects: Structure
In this subsection, we aim at presenting an equation which clearly separates the effects
of changes in the price variables upon the level of employment and its distribution between
sectors, i.e. the «structural form» of the employment effects. The information provided by
the structural form will be useful in our later analysis in conveying the rationale behind the
«reduced form» results. Rewriting equation [24] above, we have:
[39]




where 2 is as defined in equation [24] and:
Consider now the impact of a selective capital income tax imposed in sector X. Ex-
pressions [40] and [41] can be decomposed, for analytical purposes, into four effects:
i) Direct tax-substitution effects. If we take the levels of p and rX as fixed, the imposi-
tion of the tax generates a direct substitution effect which stimulates the demand for labour in
sector X as the use of capital in the taxed sector becomes more expensive.
Imperfect factor mobility, unemployment, and the short-period incidence of a capital income tax 39
              XL X K X X K X K X L X K X X K X L X Lp r 2 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ () ( ) ( )
            X
X X KX X KX K X KX X KX LX Lp r 2 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ () ( ) ( )
     Y
YX K X K X Lp r 2 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ()
	
 
          
  






KX X Y KX K S
KY
Y





() 0ii) Indirect substitution effect. The former effect is partly offset by an indirect substitu-
tion effect that decreases employment in sector X, as a result of the tax induced reduction in
rX. This effect can never exceed the direct tax-substitution effect, since  rXK X   0 (see
subsection 3.1) and  w 0 (for p is given at a constant level). The balance of the substitution
effects on employment is thus non-negative.
iii) Mobility effect. This effect, which operates through changes in rX, tends to increase
employment when the net rental to capital in sector X falls. The justification of this expan-
sionary effect is artificial to some extent, since mobility operates through changes in rY as
well, but in the opposite direction (this is so because as p falls, rY rises, with the same qualita-
tive impact upon capital movements as a fall in rX). In what follows, we shall abstract from
the latter. Let us start with sector Y. Given p —and, thus, rY and w—, a reduction in the net
rate of profits in the taxed industry, rX, will stimulate the migration of capital units to sector
Y. But with a constant wage-rental ratio and homogeneous production functions, any in-
crease in the capital stock employed in the untaxed sector must take place at the initial capi-
tal-labour ratio. Hence the expansionary mobility effect upon LY associated with a fall in rX
(see expression 41). Now we may ask how is it possible that the ratio X/Y be constant (as im-
plied by homotheticity and a constant q) with KX falling? Clearly, industry X will not be able
to increase production unless new labour units are hired. This explains the sign of the coeffi-
cient in ~ K in equation [40].
iv) Output price effect. This effect, which is represented by the  terms in [39]-[41], is
a composite of substitution, demand and mobility influences that tend to depress employ-
ment in both sectors. Any increase in p, given >0, rises the wage-rental ratio and favours
substitution of capital for labour in both sectors (in sector Y the rise in w/rY is further encoura-
ged by rY). The ensuing reduction in rY leads to an increase in the ratio rX/rY, thus moderating
the outflow of capital from sector X. Finally, any rise in p will tend to discourage consumers
demand for X and reduce employment in the taxed industry.
Figures 3 and 4 present two different types of adjustment of the employment level follo-
wing the introduction of a selective capital income tax. The length of the horizontal axis is
equal to the total supply of labour, and LX(.) and Ly(.) measure the demand for labour by sec-
tor X and Y, respectively, for any given value of w. Shifts in the L-curves are decomposed
into the direct tax effect and the indirect effects that operate through changes in rX (note that
the output price effects are represented by movements along the L-curves, since  wp  ). In
the case depicted in Figure 3, the degree of capital mobility is relatively «high» (i.e. ~ K >
(KX/KX)X)’ which implies that for any given p, a reduction, in rX increases employment
in both sectors. However, the fact that p will rise as a result of the tax (see equation 26) con-
tributes to an increase in unemployment through a higher w. The final effect is «a priori» in-
determinate: as . Figure 4 illustrates the case characterized by a relative
«low» degree of capital mobility (i.e. ~ K <(KX/KX)X): contractions in rX will tend to re-
duce employment in sector X for any given level of p and w. As in the previous case,
as .
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Figure 3. «High» capital mobility
Figure 4. «Low» capital mobility4.2. Balanced budget incidence: The mobility effect
The decompositions above show the main channels through which the incidence effects
are propagated and identify parameters determining the employment effects of taxation.
Now we seek a «reduced form» equation that can be used to evaluate the total impact of a se-
lective capital income tax on employment once relative prices have reached their new equi-
librium values.
As we saw in section 2 above, the system of incidence is recursive with respect to
changes in employment. Thus, in order to solve for  L/  KX all that we need to do is to substi-
tute the price effects [26] and [27] into the employment equation [24] to obtain:
[42]
where:
Expression [42] neatly illustrates the role of substitution, mobility and demand in the de-
termination of tax induced employment changes.
Some inspection of the employment equation enables us to establish a preliminary ob-
servation: although the qualitative sign of  L/  KX is ambiguous, it does not depend upon the
size of the elasticity of capital mobility. It is worth noting that the elasticities of factor substi-
tution will always move employment in opposite directions, due to the type of tax under con-
sideration: a selective tax on capital in sector X. The indirect substitution effects on employ-
ment are always non-positive, reflecting the rise of wages in both sectors. However, in the
presence of a selective capital income tax there exists a positive direct substitution effect
which raises the user’s cost of capital in the taxed industry. Equation [42] reveals that the net
substitution effect in sector X will be non-negative. To see why, suppose that the wage paid
by X-firms is held constant in terms of X, i.e. 	 = 1. From the expressions of the price effects
of the tax (see section 3) we can see that the gross-of-tax relative cost of capital is left un-
changed, i.e.  w– rXK X   with 	 = 1. In this case, factor substitution in sector X will not pro-
duce any employment effects. Industry Y, however, will have an incentive to reduce employ-
ment, since  w– rY > 0 when 	 > 0. In the general case, 0 < 	 < l implies  w –  rX –   X #0and
 w– rY > 0, which explains the signs of the coefficients in $X and $Y.
The direction of the impact of tax-induced adjustments in demand depends on the sign of
the factor intensity differential coefficient, |,|. The reason of course is the necessity for the
expanding (declining) industry to increase (reduce) employment according to its initial rela-
tive factor intensity. A selective capital income tax will tend to raise the price of X and re-
duce the share of X in consumption, thus increasing (reducing) employment in sector Y(X).
In a fixed-coefficients world, the question of which of these employment effects dominates
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 ,-  , -will depend upon relative factor intensities: if the taxed sector is relatively labour-intensive
(i.e. |,|>0), the tax-induced change in demand will reduce total employment, and vice versa
when |,|<0.
The above results and expression [42] allow to summarize the employment effects of a
selective capital income tax in the following:
Proposition 3:
Following the imposition of a selective capital income tax in sector X,
i) if 	 = l or $X = 0, a necessary (sufficient) condition for the level of employment to
rise (fall) is that the taxed sector be relatively capital-(labour) intensive, i.e.
ii) if 	 =0o r$X = 0, a necessary (sufficient) condition for total employment to decline
(expand) is that the taxed sector be relatively labour-(capital-)intensive, i.e.
iii) when $X = $Y = 0 (fixed coefficients of production in both sectors), total employ-
ment will fall (rise) if the taxed sector is relatively labour-(capital-)intensive:
iv) when |,|= 0 and $X = $Y >0 ,
v) when $X = $Y = $S >0 ,
Parts i) and ii) in Proposition 3 are obvious (see 42). The result in the generalized
Leontief technology case (part iii) follows from the fact that substitution in demand is the
only source of employment changes. Thus, since employment in sector X(Y) declines (in-
creases) with the outflow (inflow) of capital from the taxed sector at the fixed initial factor
proportions, the net result depends solely upon relative factor intensities. In part iv), with
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$0 identical factor proportions and equal elasticities of substitution in both sectors, the employ-
ment effect of a selective capital income tax depends upon the weights in the wage function,
	 and (1–	). When the real wage is constant in terms of Y (	 = 0), the tax will make labour
cheaper in terms of X. In this case, factor substitution will encourage employment in the de-
clining industry, and sector Y will expand at a constant wage-rental ratio, thus increasing to-
tal employment. The remaining cases may be explained in a similar fashion.
Claims iv) and v) in Proposition 3 are of particular interest because they include the spe-
cial case where the technology is of the Cobb-Douglas type, $X = $Y = 1, an assumption
which has been widely used in applied work. In both iv) and v), when the nominal wage does
not respond to changes in p, a tax (subsidy) on capital in sector X will be beneficial (harmful)
for total employment. Finally, when $X = $Y = $S the results do not depend upon relative fac-
tor intensities. A relatively small -KX will suffice for employment to increase following the
introduction of the tax, even with the real wage rigid in terms of good X (	 = 1).
We now turn to the effect of a change in the degree of capital mobility upon the employ-
ment effect of a selective capital income tax. As we noted above, labour employed in both
sectors and capital in the taxed sector will benefit from increase in the degree of capital mo-
bility. What can we say concerning changes in employment?
Denoting the term in branckets in equation [42] by 2, we can readily obtain:
[43]
[44]
The above expressions establish the following:
Proposition 4:
i) If the employment effect of the tax is positive (negative), policies intended to in-
crease the degree of capital mobility will further increase (reduce) the level of employment.
ii) The magnitude of the sensitivity of the level of employment to changes in the de-
gree of capital mobility will be greater the smaller is the initial degree of capital mobility.
This proposition has the following implication: the interests of labour with respect to
wages and employment do not necessarily conflict: w and L can move in the same direction
following an increase in ~ $K . It is worth noting, however, that if there exists an explicit em-
ployment objective in economic policy-making, policies aimed at reducing (increasing) the
degree of capital mobility will minimize (reinforce) the negative (positive) employment ef-
fects of taxation.
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 -- !$  4.3. Differential incidence: consumption taxes and wage taxes
The foregoing analysis is built upon the assumption that the tax revenue can be returned
back to consumers as a lump-sum subsidy. The balanced-budget incidence approach, though
useful if we are interested in isolating «the» impact of the tax, is probably not the most mea-
ningful approach for practical purposes. A more appealing method of evaluation of a tax
scheme consists in comparing its incidence with that of an equal-yield tax (subsidy) adjust-
ment that would keep the budget balanced. We now consider two such fiscal adjustments: a
consumption subsidy on X and a wage subsidy to labour employed in X. In fact, this differen-
tial-incidence exercise allows us to compare the employment-effect of equal-yield taxes.
The equal-yield conditions are given by expressions [36a] and [36b]. Substituting into




The above results have significant implications for the analysis of the employment
effects of equal-yield, selective taxes. In particular, the following proposition may be
established:
Proposition 5:
i) If substitution possibilities exist in the taxed sector, X > 0, then a tax on capital de-
creases (increases) employment less (more) than a commodity tax on X, for all X.
ii) If X > 0, a wage tax reduces employment more than any other tax, for all K.
iii) Sufficient conditions that ensure identical employment effects of the three taxes
considered are: a) X = 0, and b) ~ K = Y = S =0 .
These results are eminently plausible, and follow from the substitutability of factors in
production. According to the above proposition, a partial tax (subsidy) on capital is the best
Imperfect factor mobility, unemployment, and the short-period incidence of a capital income tax 45
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 	(worst) fiscal instrument from the employment perspective. For any degree of factor mobi-
lity, a wage tax raises the (gross) relative cost of labour in X the most, and a tax on capital
raises (lowers) the (gross) relative cost of labour in X the least (most). This is also true with
respect to the wage-rental ratio in Y if capital mobility is less than perfect. Provided that subs-
titution possibilities exist in the taxed sector, the results in Proposition 5 follow immedia-
tely.
If we put together the above results with the price effects analysed in the previous sec-
tion, we may readily establish an interesting conclusion. Following an equal-yield tax substi-
tution, consumers’ interests with respect to wages and employment are irreconciliable: the
tax which raises wages the most (least), tLX(tKX), is the worst (best) from the employment cre-
ation perspective, as long as substitution possibilities exist in the taxed sector, for any degree
of capital mobility. Put in a different fashion, the taxes which harm capital the most are the
best from the employment point of view.
4.4. Sectoral distribution of changes in employment. The «regional subsidy
problem»
In many practical problems it is important to know not just the tax-induced change in to-
tal employment, but also the sectoral distribution of employment changes. How is agricul-
tural employment affected by a tax on capital employed in the industrial sector? Is this tax al-
ways harmful for industrial employment? On the other hand, a generally accepted objective
of regional policy consists in raising the level of labour’s income in the target region. Are
capital subsidies always effective concerning this objective? Finally, we have seen in the
preceding subsection that capital subsidies are not the most effective means of increasing to-
tal employment. Is this also true at the regional/sectoral level? In what follows we shall
briefly analyse this question in the light of our model.
Substituting equations [26] and [27] into the «structural» equations for  LX and  LY




The only source of asymmetry in the sectoral employment effects of a selective capital
income tax has to do with the tax-induced adjustment of the goods market. In absence of substi-
tution possibilities in either industry, the tax will reduce the share of X in demands, thus re-
ducing(increasing) employment in sector X(Y). On the other hand, if X = S = 0, employ-
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ment will fall in both sectors. Other features of the sectoral responses of unemployment to
the imposition of the tax may be summarized in the following:
Proposition 6:
For all, $K =0 ,
i) A necessary condition for LX to increase is $X > 0 with 	 < 1; sufficient conditions
for an increase in LX are, among others: a) 	 = 0 and $X "$ S, and b) $X = $S, $Y = 0 and
	', KX;
ii) A necessary condition for LY to fall is $Y > 0 with 	 > 0; sufficient conditions for an
increase in LY are, among others: a) 	 = 0, and b) $Y =0 .
iii) If $X = $Y = $S > 0, employment in both sectors will change in the same proportion,
i.e.  LX /   KX Y L  /  KX
13; furthermore, as (where -Y
is the distributive share of the its good in national income);
iv) If $X =0 ,$Y = 1 and $S = 	,  LL XY # 0.
Parts i) and ii) require little comment. Employment in sector X will fall if the substitution
effect, always beneficial for labour 14, is zero (i.e. $X =0o r	 = 1) or its size is not enough to
cushion the negative impact of substitution in sector Y and the fall in the demand for X. On
the other hand, if the technology of the untaxed sector is of the Leontief type, the tax will
raise employment in this sector, since the capital inflow to this sector will be accommodated
at the initial factor proportions. Changing signs, the above results give conditions under
which employment-oriented fiscal policies based on the subsidization of the cost of use of
capital will be successful: the smaller (larger) elasticity of substitution in the taxed (untaxed)
sector, the larger elasticity of substitution in demand and the larger weight of the subsidized
good in the wage function, the most effective will be a selective capital income subsidy from
an employment perspective.
In the general case, there are no reasons to expect that employment in both sectors will
move in the same direction in response to the tax. However, cases may be found in which
changes in employment will be not just of the same sign, but also of the same proportional
size. Part iii) in Proposition 6, for example, refers to the interesting case in which the techni-
cal elasticities of substituion are identical, and equal to the elasticity of substitution in de-
mand Here,  LX /   KX Y L  /  KX . This result will hold in the relevant case of Cobb-Douglas
technology and preferences, $X = $Y = $S =1 .
Frequently, most regional policies for economic development of depressed areas are ex-
pressly aimed to increase labour’s income in the target regions (see, for example, Bird, 1966,
Gold, 1968 and Moes, 1962). The results in our discussion suggest that the objectives of in-
creasing regional employment and raising labour’s income are not necessarily equivalent.
The reason is of course that any subsidy tends to reduce labour costs, since the subsidy re-
sults in a lower price of goods produced in the target region. Thus, wages and employment
can move in opposite directions, in which case we cannot a priori predict the qualitative
change in labour’s income. In order to briefly explore the possibilities of success of capi-
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	tal-oriented subsidization policies to raise labour’s income, RLX = wLX, differentiate totally
and substitute equations [28] and [47] to obtain:
[49]
expression which allows to establish:
Proposition 7: For all $K >0 ,
i) A selective capital subsidy will raise labour’s income in the target region if the re-
gional production function is of the Leontief type and wages are inelastic with respect to the
price of the subsidized region’s output, i.e. RLX >0i f$X = 	 =0 .
ii) Sufficient conditions for labour’s income in the target region to fall are, among
others: a) $X "$ S and 	 = 0; and b) $X = $S, $Y = 0 and 	', KX; and
iii) If $X = $Y = $X = 1 (Cobb-Douglas production and demand functions),
	 = 0 implies  RLX <0
	 = 1 implies
The rationale of the result in i) is easily understood: á = 0 implies that the real wage (in
terms of Y) does not change with the subsidy, and $X = 0 ensures that the subsidy-induced
capital inflow is incorporated to production in sector X only if LX rises in the same propor-
tion. Part ii) refers to cases where RLX falls because of the predominance of a substitution
effect against labour, relatively more costly as a result of the subsidy. Finally, the
Cobb-Douglas case iii) ensures that LX falls with 	 = 0; this fact, together with the constancy
of the wage in terms of Y explains the reduction in RLX. On the other hand, with 	 =1 ,t h e
effect of the subsidy on RLX could go either way, since the subsidy incentivates the demand
for labour but reduces wages.
We now turn to the «regional subsidy problem», which may be stated as follows. For a
given resource cost and any degree of capital mobility, which of the three selective subsidies
under study —capital, labour, and production subsidies— is more effective from an employ-
ment perspective? This question was a matter of great concern in the 60s and early 70s. Al-
though most opinions favour the use of wage subsidies, economic arguments have been
offered to provide a rationale against labour-oriented subsidy policies for regional
development:
«(...) policies aimed at inducing firms to use more labour (for example, in regions of high
unemployment) by directly subsidizing their wage bill may be theoretically deficient. Subsi-
dies to capital may induce firms to use relatively less labour; but it does not follow that subsi-
dies to labour will have the opposite effect (...), unless there is also a change in the rate of inte-
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#0 -,rest; and there is no reason to expect the latter change merely because a subsidy in now given
to the use of labour» [Bird, 1966, p. 119].
Two typical assumptions in this literature are those of perfect capital mobility across re-
gions and wage rigidity in the target region. Nonetheless, this characterization of reality can
be easily criticized from different perspectives. Perfect capital mobility is probably not the
most sensible way of representing reality in the short-run, particularly so from a regional pers-
pective. According to Bird (1965), «if this assumption were true, there would hardly be a
branch of study called «regional economics"». On the other hand, the existence of wage ri-
gidities is not an exclusive feature of depressed regions. Labour unions’ pressures tend to
equalize wages across regions and industries of developed economies. In the case of LDCs,
it is frequent to observe regional/sectoral minimum wages (see Balassa, 1982) and genera-
lized sticky wages (see Agarwala, 1983) originated by social policies aimed to ensure an ade-
quate level of income to labour.
In order to shed some light into the problem, we can use our model to compute the diffe-
rential incidence of the three selective subsidies. Using the equal cost conditions [36a] and




Expressions [50] to [51] allow to establish two important conclusions: i) For a given re-
source cost and any degree of capital mobility, a regional subsidy on capital will cause larger
capital inflows than does a subsidy on production, with a wage subsidy causing the smallest
capital inflows 16. This result holds in the full-employment case as well (see McLure, 1970);
and ii) This ranking of subsidies is reversed when the policy objective is employment cre-
ation, as long as substitution possibilities exist in the subsidized region. This finding contra-
dicts Bird’s (1965, 1966) suggestion (see also Milliman, 1966). In fact, capital subsidies
might increase unemployment in the target region.
Which subsidy is the «best» from an employment perspective? According to expression
[52], the answer is unambiguous: as long as substitution possibilities exist in the target re-
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gion, a wage subsidy is always preferable, for any degree of interregional capital mobility.
When capital is region-specific, a subsidy to capital will raise profits in the target region,
with no employment effects. On the other hand, a wage subsidy will increase employment
even in the case of region-specific capital, because factor substitution favourable to labour
implies in this case addition of labour units to a fixed capital stock. The advantage of a wage
subsidy versus a production subsidy is in the fact that the former tends to induce a greater re-
duction in the consumer price of good X and, thus, a greater fall in the relative cost of labour
to firms in X. This argument holds for any finite degree of capital mobility.
The above ranking holds with perfect capital mobility as well. However, the explanation of
this result is slightly more subtle. According to the differential incidence results in section 3
above, when capital is perfectly mobile the three subsidies under study are equivalent for a given
revenue. Then, what does induce firms in region X to hire more labour? The answer is of course
the fact that under a wage subsidy, firms in X face a lower real wage in terms of X. Given the dis-
tribution of capital units across regions, this implies that employment will rise. To see this, note
that the real wage relevant for an X producer is w LX/p under a wage subsidy, and w/p under a
production subsidy. Noting that the equal resource cost conditions are –  LX =– ( -KX/-LX)  KX
and –  X =– -KX  KX , respectively, the differential incidence upon the real wage is:
[53]
(see Section 3). Thus, since w LX/p < w/p after subsidization, a wage subsidy will produce higher
levels of employment and output as long as substitution possibilities exist in the target region.
Discussion of the implications for the non-target region is practically absent in the availa-
ble literature, due perhaps to the lack of an explicit general equilibrium framework. Is there
any clash of interests between target and non-target regions from the employment perspec-
tive? Our model provides an unambiguous answer to this question. Noting —in view of the
results in Section 3— that q = p X, changes in the same proportion under the three equal-re-
source-cost subsidies, composition of demand will stay unchanged (homotheticity assump-
tion). This requires parallel increases in employment and output in the non-target region. In
fact, it can be shown that the ranking of subsidies with respect to their employment effect in
region Y coincides with that of the target region 17, i.e.:
[54a]
[54b]
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    This line of argument leads to the conclusion that -as long as technical substitution is
possible in the target region- the superiority of labour oriented subsidies for employment cre-
ation does not depend in any way upon the degree of capital mobility, appreciation that runs
against the suggestions made by some writers (for example, Milliman, 1966). The analysis
has also shown that there is no conflict of interests between the «depressed» and «advanced»
regions with respect to the type of subsidy policy chosen by the fiscal authority.
5. Concluding comments
In this paper we have explored the structure of the incidence of a selective capital in-
come tax in a neoclassical, two-sector, two-factor, short-period model in which the existence
of a sticky wage that exceeds the maximum level consistent with full-employment leads to
unemployment of labour. Both the assumption of sluggish intersectoral capital movements
and wage stickiness adequately characterize the scenario which is relevant for the evaluation
of the short-run effects of tax policy.
The results reached in the paper are highly general by comparison to the richer set of po-
tential outcomes in a full-employment context. For any positive and finite degree of capital
mobility, the mobility effect of a selective capital income tax is non-negative, i.e. capital em-
ployed in the taxed sector can never bear more than 100 per cent of the tax. This result is in
sharp contrast with its full-employment counterpart (González-Páramo, 1993). In general,
the tax will tend to depress the rate of return to capital in both sectors, with capital in the
taxed sector bearing most of the burden. As the cost of use of capital is increased, the relative
price of the taxed good and the nominal wage in both sectors will tend to rise. Differences in
factor intensities do not play any role in explaining the price effects of taxation.
Differential incidence analysis has revealed two interesting features of tax incidence in
the presence of wage rigidities. First, when capital mobility is perfect, capital and employed
labour are indifferent between equal-yield selective taxes on capital income, wages and con-
sumption, contrary to the corresponding full-employment result due to Mieszkowski (1967).
Second, if capital is partially mobile across sectors and the elasticity of technical substitution
in the taxed sector is positive, capital in the taxed sector and employed labour in both sectors
share a common interest with respect to equal-yield tax substitutions and exogenous in-
creases on the degree of capital mobility: both groups will prefer a wage tax to a consump-
tion tax, and the latter to a capital income tax. The rationale behind these results relates to the
differential impact that these taxes have upon the price index in the wage rule.
Turning to the employment effects of a selective capital income tax, our results indicate
that these are a priori ambiguous but qualitatively independent of the degree of capital mo-
bility. Thus, if the employment effect of the tax is positive (negative), policies intended to in-
crease the degree of capital mobility will further increase (reduce) the level of employment,
with the sensitivity of this relationship being greater the smaller is the initial degree of factor
mobility. On the other hand, the analysis has confirmed the intuitive conclusion that the in-
terests of labour with respect to wages and employment are irreconcilable: taxes that raise
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gree of capital mobility. This implies in turn that taxes which harm capital the most are best
from the employment perspective.
These rankings of employment effects -which are valid at the sector level as well- have
interesting implications for the design of subsidy policies for regional development. In par-
ticular, the best policy for employment creation in the target region is a wage subsidy, al-
though this subsidy is the one that produces smallest capital inflows into the expanding re-
gion, for any degree of capital mobility. On the other hand, capital-oriented subsidies are
those that promote the greatest capital inflows (as in the full-employment case), but might
end up by reducing the level of employment in the target region.
Turning to the limitations of the analysis in this paper, it is as well to start with the short-
comings of the assumptions used. First, the parameterization of factor mobility deserves fur-
ther research (see Mussa, 1978, 1982; Grossman, 1983, and Casas, 1984, for suggestive al-
ternatives). Second, the wage rule used is deliberately simple and no microeconomic
justification is given. In support of a constant real wage, the standard arguments may be used
(Johnson, 1969, Brecher, 1974, Blanchard, 1979, and Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, among
others). Although the results might be sensitive to different and more sophisticated specifica-
tions of the wage rule, one might also question the realism of more complex indexation
mechanisms in a short-run context. Nonetheless, this is an issue for further research. Third,
by assuming equal the elasticities of substitution between labour and the two goods, the gen-
erality of the results is somewhat limited. However, as pointed out in the text, relaxation of
this assumption -which is a straightforward but tedious exercise- leads to ambiguous inci-
dence results, depending upon the sign of the elasticities differential. All in all, we may argue
that the assumptions made constitute reasonable simplifications of reality, given our interest
in investigating the positive implications of tax incidence in an unemployment, short-run
perspective. In this respect, the analysis has produced a rich set of possible outcomes which
are directly comparable to those associated to a full-employment setting.
Notes
1. In effect, the wage function [5] is ad hoc in nature, and one may come up with different specifications that
would perhaps change our results. In particular, the form of the wage rule could be made a function of a basket
of goods consumed. COLA mechanisms, however, are not usually subject to short-run revisions, i.e. wage ad-
justments are made of the basis of an old CPI.
2. This assumption does not preclude the possibility that in the long-run, government actions or the behaviour of
unions in response to the existence of unemployment might alter the wage rule (see, for example, Neary,
1982).
3. Thus, Blanchard (1998) finds that the evidence implies a long-run relationship between real wages, production
and unemployment, but the adjustment of real wages to changes in real variables is rather slow.
4. Given the level of employment, changes in p uniquely determine the corresponding changes in the composi-
tion of demand. However, a shift in the level of hours worked will alter the map of preferences over X and Y.
The outcome will be, in general, a different composition of demand for a given goods price ratio.
52 JOSÉ M. GONZÁLEZ-PÁRAMO5. This is the main implication of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (1941).
6. This point was first noted by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). Given and above their respective
equilibrium levels, the cost of use of capital exceeds the level that industry Y can pay to capital owners if
the Y-firms are to produce a positive level of output. With negative profits in the Y-industry, all the capital
units in sector Y would migrate to sector X and the economy would specialize in the production of X, contrary
to our assumption of diversification in production. On the other hand, with the rate of profits , the X-firms
would have pure profits, which contradicts the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to
scale.
7. Algebraic derivation of equations [23] and [24] is available from the author upon request.
8. The alternative assumption of perfect capital mobility implies:
This case —briefly analysed in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, Chapter 7)—, has a straightforward interpretation
once we recall the role of capital mobility in the present model: all the distributional results are uniquely deter-
mined by the «financial relations» of the economy (Jones, 1971), i.e. the price-equal-unit-cost equations. The-
se relationships imply:
From the second expression we can see that if wages are «sticky» in terms of the numéraire (i.e. 	 = 0), then
In this case, tax incidence reduces to an increase in p equal to percent. When wages are
rigid in terms of good X (i.e. 	 = 1), we know that since the full capitalization result only satis-
fies the first equation, while would be consistent with the second equation only if firms in sector X cease
in their activity as tend to become negative. In the general case, with perfect capital mobility and 0 < 	 <1 ,
employed labour will gain from the imposition of the tax in terms of good Y, and capital will lose in both
sectors.
9. Algebraic derivation is available from the author upon request.
10. Algebraic derivations of equations are available from the author upon request.
11. Denoting by 2 the term in brackets in expression [42] |,|=0a n d$X = $Y > 0 imply:
12. In this case we have:
13. Using the short notation % = $X = $Y = $S, expressions [47] and [48] allow to write:
Clearly, the sign of the change in employment is given by:
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The equality in the right-hand side is based upon the assumption that the net capital rentals are identical at the
initial equilibrium, rX = rY. Thus,
where -i is the distributional share of good i=X ,Yin national income.
14. It is easily checked that:
15. With $X = $Y = $S = 	 = 1, expression [47] becomes:
16. To see why this conclusion is true, compute the differential impact of the three taxes upon the rental differen-
tial:
Since the inflow to capital to sector X is given by the mobility condition the result in the
text follows immediately.
17. The corresponding differential incidence expressions are:
Again, a wage subsidy given to labour in X is the best option from an employment perspective in sector Y.
References
Agarwala, B. (1983), “Price distortions and growth in developing countries”, World Bank Staff
Working Papers, 575, The World Bank, Washington DC.
Atkinson, A. B. and J. E. Stiglitz (1980), Lectures on public economics, London: McGraw-Hill.
Balassa, B. (1982), “Disequilibrium analysis in developing economies: An overview”, World Develop-
ment, 10: 1027-1038.








# 	, - -






XY Y KX KY X
KY KX Y X X Y
KK r K Y pX




1 ˆˆ ˆ ||( 1 ) 0 XK X K wr      /  	 $ ' 

1 || ˆ ˆ
KX

















XK X K X
LX KX LX KX








 -  
	 
 - -  
 -
  /  #
   -
 
  / #
   -





















 /  	 , -  	 , -$  	 - $ "      -
$
 /  	 , - -  	 , - $  	 - $ "      -
	$ -
 / , $  $ "




YY X L X
KX KY KY KX K KX Y
KX X KY
YY X




XL X K Y
LL
LL
LLBehuria, S. (1984), “Taxation and employment in general equilibrium: A two-sector analysis”, Journal
of Development Economics, 14: 219-239.
Bhagwati, J. N. and T. N. Srinivasan (1983), Lectures on international trade Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: MIT Press.
Bird, R. M. (1965), “The need for a regional policy in a common market”, Scottish Journal of Political
Economy, 12: 225-242.
Bird, R. M. (1966), “Tax-subsidy policies for regional developments”, National Tax Journal, 19:
113-124.
Blanchard, O. (1979), “Wage indexing rules and the behavior of the economy”, Journal of Political
Economy, 87 (4): 798-815.
Blanchard, O. (1998), “The wage equation”, April 1998, http://econ-www. mit. edu/ faculty/ blanchar/
files/ files/The_Wage_Equation.pdf.
Blanchard, O. and S. Fischer (1989), Lectures on macroeconomics, New York: MIT Press.
Brecher, R. A. (1971), Minimum wages and the theory of international trade, Ph.D. Thesis (unpu-
blished), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University.
Brecher, R. A. (1974), “Optimal commercial policy for a minimum wage economy”, Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 14: 139-149.
Casas, F. R. (1984), “Imperfect factor mobility: A generalization and synthesis of two-sector models of
international trade”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 17: 747-761.
Das, S. P. (1981), “Effects of foreign investment in the presence of unemployment”, Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 11: 249-257.
Dixit, A. K. (1976), “Public finance in a temporary Keynesian equilibrium”, Journal of Economic The-
ory, 12: 242-258.
Dixit, A. K. (1981), “Comment”, in Bhagwati, J. N. (ed.): Import competition and response, Chicago,
Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
Fullerton, D. and G. Metcalf (2003), “Tax incidence”, en A. J. Auerbach y M. Feldstein (eds.): Hand-
book of Public Ecoconomics, 4: North-Holland, Amsterdam, cap.26.
Gold, R. B. (1968), “Interregional factor transfers and regional unemployment”, Journal of Political
Economy, 76: 246-251.
González-Páramo, J. M. (1993), “Tax shifting through mobility in the theory of tax incidence”, Public
Finance, 48: 315-328.
Grossman, G. M. (1983), “Partially mobile capital: A general approach to two-sector trade theory”,
Journal of International Economics, 15: 1-17.
Harberger, A. C. (1962), “The incidence of the corporation income tax”, Journal of Political Economy,
70: 215-250.
Helpman, E. (1976), “Macroeconomic policy in a model of international trade with a wage restriction”,
International Economic Review, 17: 262-277.
Johnson, H. G. (1965), “Optimal trade intervention in the presence of domestic distortions”, in R.
Caves et al. (eds.), Trade, growth and the balance of payments, North Holland, Amsterdam.
Imperfect factor mobility, unemployment, and the short-period incidence of a capital income tax 55Johnson, H. G. (1969), “Minimum wage laws: A general equilibrium analysis”, Canadian Journal of
Economics, 2: 599-604.
Jones, R. W. (1971), “Distortions in factor markets and the general equilibrium model of production”,
Journal of Political Economy, 79: 437-459.
Kotlikoff, L. y L. Summers (1987), “Tax incidence”, en A. J. Auerbach y M. Feldstein (eds.), Hand-
book of Public Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 2: 1043-1092.
McLure, C. E. (1970), “Taxation, substitution and industrial location”, Journal of Political Economy,
78: 112-132.
McLure, C. E. (1971), “The design of regional tax incentives for Colombia”, in M. Gillis (ed.): Fiscal
reform for Colombia, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Law School International Tax Program.
Mieszkowski, P. M. (1967), “On the theory of tax incidence”, Journal of Political Economy, 75:
250-262.
Moes (1962), Local subsidies for industry, North Carolina: Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina
Press.
Mussa, M. (1978), “Dynamic adjustment in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model”, Journal of Poli-
tical Economy, 86: 775-791.
Mussa, M. (1982), “Imperfect factor mobility and the distribution of income”, Journal of International
Economics, 12: 125-141.
Neary, J. P. (1982), “Intersectoral capital mobility, wage stickiness and the case for adjustment assis-
tance”, in J. N. Bhagwati (ed.): Import competition and response, Chicago, lllinois: University of
Chicago Press.
Stolper, W. and P. A. Samuelson (1941), “Protection and real wages”, Review of Economic Studies, 9:
58-73.
Resumen
Un hecho crucial en la perspectiva de corto plazo en muchas cuestiones de políticas públicas es la existencia de de-
sempleo causada por rigideces salariales. Al mismo tiempo, las imperfecciones en el grado de movilidad de los fac-
tores de producción entre sectores o regiones determina la naturaleza y la flexibilidad de las respuestas de la econo-
mía ante perturbaciones exógenas. No debe extrañar que la incidencia de los impuestos sobre el desempleo y la
distribución de la renta sea una preocupación central de los decisores públicos. En este trabajo se explora la estructu-
ra de la incidencia y los efectos económicos de un impuesto selectivo sobre las rentas del capital en un modelo neo-
clásico de dos factores y dos bienes, movilidad imperfecta del capital y desempleo debido a la existencia de indicia-
ción salarial.
Palabras clave: incidencia impositiva, movilidad del capital, desempleo, equilibrio general.
Clasificación JEL: H22, H25.
56 JOSÉ M. GONZÁLEZ-PÁRAMOAppendix A: Derivation of equations [23] and [24]
Equation [23]
Full-employment of capital allows to write:
,KX  cX K KX KX KY Y   ,, 0 [A.1]
If we note that:
 (   ) cw r KX LX X LX X KX    -$    [A.2]
  YK c YK Y  [A.3]
 X =– $S( p X   )+  Y [A.4]
then expression [A.1] becomes:
[A.5]
where:
 (  ) cw r KY LY Y Y  -$ [A.6]
In order to eliminate ,  wK Y and  rY from equation [A.5], we can use the wage rule [15],
the capital mobility condition  KY  –,KX~ ( ) $KX Y rr  (solving 18 and 19 for  KY ) and the
zero-profits condition for good Y,  rY =– ( 	-LY/-KY)( p X   ). After some rearrangement of
terms, we obtain:
[A.7]
Expression [A.7] gives equation [23] in the text.
Equation [24]
The rate of change in labour demand by sector X can be expressed as:
   Lc X XL X  [A.8]
On the other hand, from the definition of  cLX :
 cLX –-KX$X(    wr LX X KX      ) [A.9]
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ˆˆ ˆ ()After using the identity   cK Y KY Y  , and equation [A.4], we get:
[A.10]
Using again the capital mobility condition given above, the definition of  cKY (equation
A.6) and the price equation of sector Y, we obtain:
[A.11]
The corresponding expression for the rate of change in LY can be derived making use of
the following definition of  LY :
    Lc Kc YL YY K Y  [A.12]
Using the above procedure —i.e. substituting the definition of  cLY and  cKY and the mo-
bility condition into [A.12] and eliminating  rY and  w through the zero-profit condition of
sector Y and the wage rule—, it is easily checked that the relationship between  LY and the re-
maining endogenous variables can be expressed as follows:
[A.13]
Finally, if we recall the definition of  L as a weighed average of the changes in sectoral
employment (see equation 20), addition of expressions [A.11] and [A.13] yields:
[A.14]
which coincides with equation [24] in the text.
Appendix B: A consumption tax and a wage tax in sector X:
balanced-budget incidence
Solving the incidence system [25] for   X under the assumption that the tax revenue is re-
turned back to consumers in a lump-sum fashion, we obtain:
[B.1]
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Labour employed in both sectors gets a higher wage in terms of Y (with 	 > 0), and capi-
tal employed in the taxed industry loses under both taxes, results which are similar to those
that obtain under a selective capital income tax. However, the return to capital employed in
the taxed sector responds in a different fashion. The incidence of both taxes upon rX is seen
to depend upon the balance between the elasticity of substitution in sector X, which tends to
make capital owners better-off —due to the fact that both taxes tend to make labour rela-
tively more expensive to firms in sector X—, and the elasticities of mobility, demand and
technical substitution in sector Y. Finally, it is worth noting that in the case of a selective tax
on consuption of X, w and p can move in opposite directions (for example, $X = 0 and -LX =
-LY). This is due to the fact that, despite the possibility that p falls, the change in the con-
sumer price of X,  p X   , is always non-negative, thus implying  w"0.
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